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The problem of representation of abstract concepts, such as ‘freedom’ and
‘justice’, has become particularly crucial in recent years, owing to the
increased success of embodied and grounded views of cognition. We will
present a novel view on abstract concepts and abstract words. Since abstract
concepts do not have single objects as referents, children and adults might
rely more on input from others to learn them; we, therefore, suggest that lin-
guistic and social experience play an important role for abstract concepts. We
will discuss evidence obtained in our and other laboratories showing that
processing of abstract concepts evokes linguistic interaction and social
experiences, leading to the activation of the mouth motor system. We will
discuss the possible mechanisms that underlie this activation. Mouth
motor system activation can be due to re-enactment of the experience of con-
ceptual acquisition, which occurred through the mediation of language.
Alternatively, it could be due to the re-explanation of the word meaning,
possibly through inner speech. Finally, it can be due to a metacognitive pro-
cess revealing low confidence in the meaning of our concepts. This process
induces in us the need to rely on others to ask/negotiate conceptual mean-
ing. We conclude that with abstract concepts language works as a social tool:
it extends our thinking abilities and pushes us to rely on others to integrate
our knowledge.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Varieties of abstract concepts:
development, use, and representation in the brain’.1. Introduction
Abstract concepts (ACs) are quite heterogeneous: they differ in degree of
abstractness, varying from more to less abstract and they belong to subtypes
(e.g. emotional, social, mathematical concepts) that can be distinguished in
terms of content and neural representation [1–6].
Despite these differences, when compared with concrete concepts like
‘table’ and ‘dog’, they have much in common: they are generally difficult to
associate with a single image, they do not have a single object/entity as refer-
ent, and more often refer to complex situations with multiple objects/entities
[7]. Furthermore, even if they are grounded in sensorial modalities, they activate
less the five senses than concrete concepts [8] and their content is more variable
both within and across participants, as testified for example by the feature
variability in property generation tasks [9].
In the first part of the paper we will discuss and substantiate with evidence
two claims derived from the words as social tools (WAT) proposal on ACs
[9,10]. We state that the more abstract concepts are, (1) the more linguistic
and social/interactive input from others is needed to acquire them; (2) the
more they are represented activating linguistic brain networks, and engage
the mouth motor system and the acoustic system. In the second part we will dis-
cuss inner grounding of ACs, and focus on metacognition. We will propose a
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(a) Why language is important for abstract concepts
The view that language is important for AC representation is
not new. According to the dual-coding theory [15], concrete
concepts evoke imagistic representations, and ACs verbal
ones. In line with Paivio [15], we contend that concepts acti-
vate multiple representations. Differently from Paivio, we do
not equate imageability with concreteness, because the two
dimensions have proven to be correlated but not equivalent
[16]. In developmental psychology, the syntactic bootstrap-
ping hypothesis (e.g. [17]) proposes that children learn
‘easy words’ by mapping the words to the objects/entities
in the world. Once a substantial number of words have
been acquired, learning proceeds by adding structure to the
original machinery: this allows acquisition of ‘hard words’
such as abstract ones. In this process syntax and semantics
are strictly linked: syntax cannot substitute semantics, but it
can help learners to narrow their hypotheses on the possible
word meaning. Recently, proponents of multiple represen-
tation views have emphasized the importance of language
for AC learning [9,18,19] and representation [10,16,20–23].
Why should language be important for ACs? First of all, it
is critical for their acquisition, and this might impact their rep-
resentation. Different justice situations are far more
heterogeneous than different cups, and using a common
label helps us assemble them in a category. Furthermore,
explanations of the conceptual meaning can be more crucial
to form the concept of ‘justice’, for instance, than that of
‘cup’. In order to learn ACs we might also need to actively
ask for definitions/contributions from competent community
members [12,13] or to resort to recognized information sources
(e.g. Wikipedia). Finally, because ACs are heterogeneous and
complex, language can help us process them. Language aug-
ments our cognitive abilities, computational resources, and
problem-solving capacities [24–26]; this extension might be
pivotal to use of concepts that are increasingly abstract.
(b) Language and vocalization
When we are exposed to words, their sub-vocal pronuncia-
tion is activated [27]. This mechanism underlies the
exposure to all words, but we propose that it is more pro-
nounced in the case of abstract words. Owing to the
heterogeneity of their members, we contend that in order to
acquire ACs the scaffolding of the physical environment has
to be complemented by linguistic information, for example,
labels and explanations. This information can be conveyed
either by others (e.g. parents, experts) or by written sources
(e.g. books, Internet), depending on expertise and age. In
our view the activation of linguistic experience has an embo-
died counterpart: it should lead to a sub-vocal pronunciation
of the words and/or of (part of ) their explanations.
Responses with the mouth should thus be facilitated during
AC processing. Conversely, occupying the mouth during
AC acquisition and processing should induce an interference,
impairing acquisition and slowing down responses.(c) Evidence on mouth motor system activation during
abstract concept learning and processing
In this section, we will overview studies performed to test the
hypothesis that AC processing involves the mouth more than
does concrete concept processing. First, we found facilitation
of mouth responses in studies on learning of novel/artificial
categories in adults. We operationalized concrete categories
as having a single, concrete object as referent, rich in percep-
tual features; abstract categories were instead operationalized
by multiple interacting elements (e.g. small cylinders moving
in spirals and then knocking against each other) [28]. Once
they learned these novel categories, participants were
taught their names. Results of a subsequent property verifica-
tion task revealed a facilitation of microphone (mouth)
responses to abstract words. This facilitation was more pro-
nounced when the word meaning had been explained to
the participants. Responses to concrete words were instead
facilitated when participants responded by pressing a key
with the hand (figure 1a).
Second, facilitation of the mouth responses occurred also
in the processing of real abstract words. Borghi & Zarcone
[29] asked participants to decide whether abstract and con-
crete prime-definitions matched with Italian concrete and
abstract target-words: to respond they pressed a key with
the hand or a device with the teeth. The advantage of hand
over mouth responses disappeared with abstract words, con-
firming that AC processing activates the mouth motor system
(figure 1b). The finding is consistent with results from explicit
ratings with words and sentences. Participants think that
abstract words involve the mouth more and concrete words
the hand more [31]. Similarly, the content of mental state sen-
tences was more associated with mouth actions than with
hand or leg actions, while the content of maths-related sen-
tences was more associated with the hand [3], likely due to
the activation of finger-counting habits [32].
The studies illustrated so far provide evidence of facili-
tation with mouth responses when processing novel and
real abstract words. If the activation of the mouth motor
system is not simply a by-product of AC processing, then
occupying the mouth should interfere with word acquisition
and processing. We performed two developmental studies
investigating whether pacifier use influences language acqui-
sition and processing later in life, and one study investigating
whether actively moving the mouth (gum chewing) affects
adults’ online processing of ACs. Barca et al. [33] asked
first-grade children to define abstract (agreement), concrete
(flag) and emotional (pain) words. Children were divided
in groups depending on how long they had been using the
pacifier (never, until age 2, until age 3, beyond 3 years). Defi-
nitions were then evaluated in terms of accuracy and the
conceptual relations provided to define the words were
coded (i.e. perceptual, spatial, action–function, emotion, situ-
ation, experiential, superordinate, subordinate, norms, free
association). Pacifier overuse did not influence accuracy of
definitions. However, the pattern of conceptual relations eli-
cited by the three kinds of words clearly differed
depending on pacifier use. The distinction between emotional
and concrete words was less marked for children who used a
pacifier for more than 3 years, and the distinction between
concrete and abstract words became progressively less
marked for children who used it until 3 years and beyond.
Independently from the type of word they had to define,
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Figure 1. Interactions between response effector and kind of concept showing a facilitation of the mouth responses with abstract concepts. (a) Property verification
task (from Borghi et al. [28]). Interaction obtained with novel categories. (b) Definition–word matching task (from Borghi & Zarcone [29]). Interaction obtained
with real categories. (c) Semantic categorization task (from Barca et al. [30]). Interaction between pacifier use and kind of concept, revealing longer response times
(RTs) with abstract concepts for late-users of pacifier. (Online version in colour.)
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associations (the only feature more frequent in abstract than
in other concepts), fewer emotional, experiential and interac-
tive relations, and slightly more subordinates. The results
suggest that overuse of pacifier during language acquisition,
even if it does not affect accuracy in defining words, influ-
ences later conceptualization: it is namely correlated with a
less marked distinction between emotional and concrete
words, and between concrete and abstract words.
Two different mechanisms might be responsible for this
phenomenon: mouth motor system interference and facial
mimicry. The mouth motor system interference one is based
on the WAT proposal: by keeping the mouth actively occu-
pied, the pacifier would hinder the benefits of linguistic
input, which is particularly crucial to learn ACs, and to
rehearse the word and/or its explanation via inner speech.
Inner speech can also serve as vehicle to metacognition, pre-
paring children to interact with others when they feel scarcely
confident on their knowledge (see later discussion on
metacognition).
Alternatively, the reduced facial mimicry induced by
pacifier use might reduce motor resonance with others,
thereby making the grounding of emotional concepts more
difficult. Importantly, the two mechanisms are not in contrast
and might even overlap. However, we are inclined to think
that they play a different role for abstract and emotional
words. We hypothesize that the mouth motor system interfer-
ence mechanism concerns specifically abstract words, in line
with the WAT view, while the facial mimicry one concerns
emotional words, in keeping with evidence showing a
relationship between pacifier use and development of
emotional competence [34].The role played by the two mechanisms can be disen-
tangled with the help of a further study [30]. We asked
8-year-olds with a different history of pacifier use to perform
a semantic categorization task: they had to press a different
key on the keyboard if the word displayed on the screen
referred to an animal or to something else. The non-animal
words were our critical items: abstract, concrete and
emotional words. Response times analyses revealed that
children who overused the pacifier processed abstract
words slower than all other children. Given that the effect
was specific for ACs and did not involve emotional ones,
the result is consistent with the view that pacifier overuse
interferes with processing of ACs and influences their
representation.
The interference effect elicited by active engagement
of the mouth during AC processing is also revealed by
another recent study [35] in which adult participants rated
complexity and pleasantness of abstract and concrete
concepts. When participants chewed gum, perceived plea-
santness of ACs decreased and perceived complexity of
ACs increased compared with concrete concepts. Gum chew-
ing has been associated with reduction of nociception and
increase of alertness, while it is debated whether it increases
calmness and contentedness (e.g. [36]). If the mood change
induced by gum chewing had an effect on performance, we
should find a general increase of pleasantness ratings and a
decrease of difficulty ratings, but we found the opposite,
and the effect was specific for ACs. We are, therefore, inclined
to believe that the effect is not due to mood or alertness modi-
fications but rather, as predicted by WAT, to the interference
induced by actively moving the mouth, which conflicts with
activation of the mouth during AC processing.
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activation
The mouth activation with abstract words, leading to facili-
tation if the mouth is a response effector or to interference if
the mouth is actively occupied during word processing,
could be due to three different mechanisms: (1) the re-
enactment of the experience of conceptual acquisition, which
typically occurred through the linguistic mediation, in a
social context. (2) The re-explanation to oneself of the word
meaning, possibly through inner speech [26]. (3) The
preparation to ask others for information on word meanings
[12–14]. Results on acquisition of novel categories showing a
facilitation of mouth responses and extended-in-time interfer-
ence effects of pacifier overuse on processing of ACs are
compatible with the re-enactment explanation: likely children
were not able to fully benefit from the input of others owing
to the pacifier, and this might influence the re-enactment of
the acquisition experience. Results showing facilitation of
mouth responses with ACs (e.g. [28,29]) and interference
when the mouth is actively involved in gum chewing are
more compatible with the second and third mechanisms, i.e.
re-explanation to oneself and/or the preparation to ask others
for information. Importantly, however, these mechanisms
could coexist; further research is needed in order to better disen-
tangle them. Notice that all mechanisms help grounding,
because they assist us in tracking conceptual referents.
These three mechanisms might be implemented through
inner articulation of the label and inner speech, viewed as a
more complex and possibly discourse-like internal articulation
of the word sound.
(i) Inner articulation of the label
While silently reading words, we covertly articulate their
sound, producing a mouth movement [27,37] or activating
the speech-motor cortex [38]. Pronouncing the name of an
object and internally articulating its label is useful to memor-
ize it but it also improves object perception. It can indeed
facilitate object finding in a visual search task [39]: using
the word ‘tree’ is better than simply thinking about a tree
to perceptually detect trees. We propose an extension of
this hypothesis: in our view the effect of labels is more crucial
with ACs. Pronouncing/hearing their labels can help us to
put together dissimilar category exemplars, thus reducing
the working memory overload linked to the generation of
many hypotheses. In addition, labels can help us to select
the relevant cues: while we observe a scene with people
running in a field we interpret it differently if we hear/
pronounce the word ‘freedom’ or the word ‘grass’.
(ii) Inner speech
We propose that with ACs the need to speak to ourselves or
to prepare to interact with others is stronger than with
concrete concepts. Inner speech can help us retrieve infor-
mation on the category exemplars, reflect on the word
meaning, reconstruct the linguistic explanations we received,
predict what we will need to search [40] and prepare our-
selves to interact with others when we feel scarcely
confident in our own knowledge. We propose that the prob-
ability of using inner speech becomes higher with the
increase of abstractness and complexity of concepts.
The proposal that AC processing likely involves inner
articulation of the label and inner speech is compatible withneural evidence on the role of both semantic and phono-
articulatory aspects of language for ACs. Consistently,
meta-analyses and functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) studies have shown a higher left-hemispheric acti-
vation, determined by stronger activation of the left inferior
frontal gyrus, typically associated with phonological working
memory, left middle temporal gyrus [41], anterior superior
temporal sulcus [42], and superior temporal gyrus, associated
with acoustic experience [43].3. Kinds of concepts, inner grounding and
mouth motor system activation
As anticipated in the Introduction, although ACs have typi-
cally been considered a unitary whole, they might greatly
differ in their content. Consistently, fMRI studies have
shown that, for example, the concept ‘arithmetic’ activates
numerical cognition areas, while the mental state concept
‘convince’ engages mentalizing and social cognition areas
[4,44]. Other concepts like ‘confidence’ and ‘self-esteem’
might instead be grounded on metacognition. Along similar
lines, Barsalou [45] proposed that the grounding of ACs
such as ‘truth’ depends on the monitoring of internal, inferen-
tial processes, such as the successful/unsuccessful matching
of expectations and sensations. We will here contend that
metacognition not only is relevant to explain the differences
in content between ACs but also can offer a new mechanism.
We have extensively discussed one of the crucial mechan-
isms involved in AC processing, namely linguistic activation.
We will now illustrate a second mechanism that in our view
characterizes AC representation, and propose a possible
relationship between metacognition and language covert
activation.
(a) Inner grounding
Inner grounding is the process of grounding concepts on
perceptual systems tracking states and processes in the
environment inside the body. Internal perceptual systems
can be contrasted with perceptual systems that track infor-
mation in the environment outside the body or at the
interface between body and external environment (e.g.
vision, audition, touch). Some concepts are grounded
mostly on perceptual systems that track information about
what happens in the outside world, while other concepts
are more related to the inside world. Different perceptual
systems are tuned to track information on internal states
and processes. Interoception tracks information about the
state and processes of the body organs, while proprioception
tracks information about the state and processes of the body
itself and its parts. We consider metacognition as another
kind of internal perceptual process, tuned to track
information about cognitive states and brain processes.
We hypothesize that concepts that are grounded on meta-
cognitive processes are perceived as more abstract than those
grounded on interoception and proprioception. A possible
reason is that the information tracked by proprioception
and interoception could also be partly picked up by extero-
ception. Only metacognition tracks precisely the kind of
information that cannot be picked up by any external percep-
tual system, much like colour information cannot be tracked
by the haptic system and temperature cannot be tracked by
the visual system.
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Inner grounding in general, and metacognition in particular,
can be important mechanisms useful to distinguish between
abstract and concrete concepts, and also to identify different
kinds of ACs. We identify two forms of metacognition that
might characterize ACs. General metacognition concerns more
generally the tracking of states and processes occurring in
the brain. For example, to classify an experience as a recall/
memory, rather than as mere imagery, we need to interpret
the image as deriving from a memory trace. Instead, if the
image is a ‘fantasy’, we keep trace of having built it within
our mind. These inner brain operations share many aspects
with introspective properties that, according to Barsalou &
Wiemer-Hastings [46], characterize ACs; they need not have
a specific feeling associated with them, and are likely uncon-
scious. We hypothesize that general metacognition involves the
majority of ACs, but especially mental state ones.
There is another dimension to metacognition that we
propose to be crucial for grounding of ACs. This dimension is
inspired by the distinction introduced by Shea [14] between
implicit deference—the disposition to rely on others while
using a concept—and explicit deference—a judgment on our
ownmental states, forexample leadingus todecide that our con-
cept is not adequate. This distinction is at the basis of the notion
of social metacognition we propose. One of the reasons why
language and sociality are important for ACs, is that we might
need to rely on others to fix reference. This process is based on
ametacognitive assessment:we reflect onourownconcepts, rea-
lizing that to fully capture their meaning we need the
contribution of others. We use the term social metacognition to
suggest a link between an internal process, the awareness of
our knowledge inadequacy, and the need to activate actions
directed toward others. Studies on testimony reveal the increas-
ing ability of children to rely on others as information sourcesespecially in abstract domains, such as God, death and life,
and to monitor their competence [47]. We hypothesize that this
formofmetacognition increaseswith the increaseof theabstract-
ness level, and that it might explain the activation of the mouth
motor representation. The idea that language can provide access
to grounding is compatible alsowith the recent fMRI finding [48]
that ACs activate both linguistic contextual information and
semantic features, but in different brain regions: linguistic con-
textual information is reflected mostly in high-level linguistic
areas, whereas semantics engages distributed brain areas.
(c) Inner grounding and language: evidence
Preliminary results of a recent study can give some hints on the
role played by language and inner grounding for ACs [6]. Par-
ticipants rated 425 Italian abstract concepts on a variety of
dimensions, from the most classical ones, typically used to
identify ACs (abstractness, concreteness, imageability), to
more novel ones, such as emotional valence [16], interoception
[49], body–object interaction (BOI: ease with which a human
body can physically interact with a word’s referent; [50]),
social valence [1,9], perceptual strength in sight, hearing,
touch, taste, olfaction [8], age of acquisition (AoA), modality
of acquisition (MoA: based more on experience or more on
language; [51]), andgeneral-metacognition (reliance on internal
mental/cognitive processes). Interestingly, abstractness was
positively correlated with modality of acquisition (MoA) and
metacognition, and negatively correlated with imageability,
BOI, concreteness, touch and sight (figure 2a). Hence, ACs are
associated with linguistic acquisition, which occurs late. Five
latent factors underlie the original dimensions (figure 2b). Fac-
tors aggregated as follows: (1) abstractness, including the
opposition between concreteness, BOI, vision/sight and image-
ability to abstractness, AoA and MoA; (2) inner grounding,
characterized by the positive correlations between
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i.e. the four external perceptual modalities, except hearing
likely because highly correlatedwith social valence; (4) emotion
polarity (negative and positive emotions); (5) social dimension,
including social valence and audition. Thus inner grounding
factor is independent from abstractness, while linguistic MoA
is not. This distinction is reflected in analyses on concept
kinds. We classified the terms into 11 categories, following the
major classifications of the literature (e.g. emotions, mental
states, institutional concepts). Further cluster analyses will
allow us to test our hypotheses on how items/words group
together. We performed ANOVAs to ascertain whether and
how the categories identified by the experimenters differed
from each other on each dimension. We found a major distinc-
tion between ACs such as ‘emotions’ and ‘bodily states’,
characterized by higher scores in interoception and BOI, and
‘institutional’ and ‘knowledge domains’ (e.g. philosophy)
concepts, judged to be linguistically acquired (higher MoA).
This study suggests that perceived differences in concept
kinds depend not only on content but also on mechanisms,
such as interoception and language activation. Interestingly,
the more concepts are grounded in external and internal per-
ception (interoception), the less linguistic experience weighs.
Consistently, recent fMRI evidence revealed that mental state
concepts activate the face motor system in the brain more
than emotional concepts [52].
As to metacognition, as expected, general-metacognition
was more strongly correlated to abstractness than emotion
(interoception was not correlated to abstractness), but ratings
did not differ between concepts kinds. However, ratings might
be limited in accessing a likely largely unconscious dimension.
The case is different for social-metacognition, not tested in this
preliminary study. Social-metacognition might bemore explicit
because it leads to an action with others. In future work we
plan to investigate how it characterizes ACs and whether it
interacts with mouth motor system activation. We predict that
the more concepts are abstract and complex, the more social-
metacognition weighs, and the more the mouth is activated,
either to re-explain to ourselves conceptual meaning or to
prepare ourselves to ask/negotiate it to/with others.4. Conclusion
The WAT view proposes that ACs activate linguistic and
social experience. We overviewed recent studies supportingthis proposal, showing that language activation engages the
mouth motor system. Mouth involvement seems to play a
substantial role, as interference effects (pacifier overuse in
infancy, gum chewing during online processing) reveal.
The reviewed evidence suggests that this activation is due
to the inner articulation of the label and/or to inner speech,
contributing either to the re-enactment of the acquisition
experience, to the re-explanation to ourselves of the concep-
tual meaning and/or to the information request on the
conceptual meaning to others. Across the three mechanisms,
phonological and semantic information are strictly interwo-
ven. Importantly, all mechanisms contribute to grounding,
because through different strategies they help us to search
for conceptual referents.
The activation of language and of the mouth motor system
does not occur to the same extent with all concepts. We argued
that ACs are characterized by inner grounding.While for more
‘embodied’ ACs interoception and proprioception play a
major role, for less ‘embodied’ ACs we might need language
and metacognition. We propose that even abstract meta-
cognitive processes are accomplished with the help of a
bodily medium, the mouth. Sub-vocalizations and inner
speech can namely facilitate tracking of information about
cognitive states and brain processes. We predict that the
mouth motor system activation is particularly pronounced
when we feel uncertain of our concepts and need to rely on
others (social metacognition).
In conclusion, words are social tools in many senses: in
the most obvious sense that they help us to communicate
with others and change the state of the world, and in two
most subtle senses discussed in this paper: words extend
our thinking abilities, and they open us to sociality when
we doubt our knowledge and we need to share and align
with others [53].
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